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Abstract: Uncertainty pervades all aspects of environmental policy making. Numerous typologies and
techniques have been developed to conceptualise, classify, assess (qualitatively and quantitatively),
propagate, control, reduce and communicate uncertainty. Such assessments are a necessary but insufficient
condition for reducing uncertainty in environmental decision making. In this paper we discuss how
uncertainty is translated into decisions. Since this entails numerous value judgements and trade-offs which
are sensitive to how policy problems are framed, we argue that perceptions of uncertainty cannot be viewed
independently of the (quality of) the policy process that it intends to inform. Thus, uncertainty management
should not be limited to the elicitation of preferences and value judgements under uncertainty. Rather, it
should be embedded within policy making processes more generally, including learning, surfacing tacit
assumptions and scrutinising beliefs and knowledge.
Keywords: Integrated Water Resources Management; Uncertainty analysis; Scientific Policy Aid; Policy
Analysis

1.

INTRODUCTION

Recent emphasis on uncertainty in environmental
decision making reflects numerous changes in
environmental science and policy making over the
past few decades. First, environmental policy
problems
increasingly
involve
large,
interconnected and complex social choices. For
example, climate change, ozone depletion,
biodiversity loss, genetically engineered crops,
environment-related diseases and health risks
involve large scale, long-term impacts, whose
precise causes and consequences are often poorly
understood. Given these uncertainties and the risk
of irreversible environmental changes, different
perspectives about the nature, policy implications,
or even the existence of a problem are inevitable
[Ackoff, 1979; Rittel and Webber, 1973; Rosness,
1998; Sarewitz, 2004].
Secondly, as a consequence, environmental
policies1 have shifted to more precautionary
1

Relevant examples in the EU include the Sixth
Environment Action Programme (EAP); Pollutant
Emission Register; Regulatory framework for the

[Dorman, 2005; Dupuy and Grinbaum, 2005;
Tallacchini, 2005; van Asselt and Vos, 2005;
Vineis, 2005], non-structural [de Loe and
Wojtanowski, 2001; Faisal et al., 1999; Hooper
and Duggin, 1996; Lu et al., 2001b; Sabino et al.,
1999] and demand-led approaches [de Santa Olalla
Manas et al., 1999; Froukh, 2001; Gumbo et al.,
2004; Mohamed and Savenije, 2000].
Thirdly, and also as a consequence of these new
environmental problems, the process of policy
making
has
increasingly
favoured
interdisciplinary, pluralistic, and inclusive
methodologies [Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2004;
Tacconi, 1998; van den Bergh et al., 2000b], with
scientists
participating
alongside
other
stakeholders in deliberative decision making
Registration, Evaluation and Authorisation of
Chemicals (REACH); Council Directive 96/82/EC
on the control of major-accident hazards involving
dangerous substances called also Seveso II
Directive; proposal of EU Framework for
Community Action in the field of Marine
Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive);
Strategy for Sustainable Development; Water
Framework Directive.

[Baber, 2004; Davies and Burgess, 2004; Renn,
2006], participatory assessment [Argent and
Grayson,
2003;
Cramb
et
al.,
2004;
Kouplevatskaya-Yunusova and Buttoud] or group
model building [Sterman, 2002; Stirling, 2006;
Vennix, 1999].
These transformations are intertwined with a
changing relationship between science and society,
favouring greater openness and a dialog between
all knowledgeable parties [Fairhead and Scoones,
2005; Johnston and Soulsby; Robertson and
McGee, 2003], often laying emphasis on multiple
methods and perspectives in tackling these
problems.
In this context, ‘uncertainty’ has become
increasingly important in environmental science
and policy making. One reason is that policy
outcomes are only partly predictable and their
associated uncertainties are large enough to sustain
persistent conflicts and indecision. Related to this
is the tendency for scientists to conceal uncertainty
from fear of diminishing their professional
credibility and encouraging indecision [Bradshaw
and Borchers, 2000]. It is also because uncertainty
provides a political resource, which can sustain
personal beliefs and self-interest [Stirling, 2006;
Weiss, 2002]. Uncertainty poses various
philosophical challenges regarding the origin,
nature and value of knowledge, ethical challenges
regarding acceptable levels of knowledge and risk,
its distribution, and who has the mandate to
decide, and political challenges regarding how to
act when faced with substantial uncertainty. It also
poses several practical challenges, in terms of
identifying
and
describing
(quantifying,
qualifying) uncertainties, propagating them
through decisions and communicating the results
of an uncertainty analysis.
Recent emphasis on uncertainty within science has
led to many perspectives on how risk and
uncertainty should be defined and tackled (see for
a review [Brown, 2004; Brown et al., 2005;
Refsgaard et al., 2005; Rotmans and van Asselt,
2001a; Rotmans and van Asselt, 2001b; van
Asselt, 1999; Walker et al., 2003]. Indeed, there is
little consensus on how uncertainty should be
defined, nor a consistent, interdisciplinary,
framework in which to address it (although some
attempts have been made, such as Walker et. al.
2004). This reflects the complex nature of
uncertainty and the diversity of disciplines in
which it is a topic of research.
Harmonising these different concepts is not simply
an issue of accepting terminology, but an issue of
exploring the diversity of words and meanings
associated with uncertainty as an “umbrella

concept” (e.g. including terms such as imperfect,
indeterminate, indecisive, ambiguous, imprecise,
inaccurate, vague, and ignorant). The differences
between competing understandings of uncertainty
(e.g. as a feature of real world systems versus a
state of mind or some combination of the two) are
deeply rooted in the methodological contexts in
which uncertainty is conceptualised and debated.
For example, while mathematicians agree on the
basic principles of conditional probability, they
may disagree on the range of applications in which
Bayes’ rule (of conditional probabilities) is
appropriate, due to important philosophical
differences on the nature of probability. In the
context of this paper, the lack of a coherent
understanding of uncertainty is only significant as
far as it frustrates scientific policy advice. Indeed,
in scientific research, the variety of competing
views and interpretations of uncertainty (and
scientific concepts in general) is favourable in the
long term for encouraging debate and advancing
knowledge. Policy related research on the other
hand is action-oriented and competing scientific
interpretations prevent shared commitments and
make scientific testimony increasingly politicised
[Lovbrand and Oberg, 2005; Pielke, 2004;
Sarewitz, 2004; Stirling, 2006; Weiss, 2002].
In this paper we discuss the role and value of
uncertainty in environmental decision making,
informed and aided by science. The paper is
complementary to the discussion in Maier and
Ascough (2006)2, which focuses on uncertainties
in scientific simulation models. For this reason, a
detailed discussion of uncertainty in scientific
models is avoided here. In section 2, we briefly
outline the nature of uncertainty in policy-related
research. This topic is not discussed in detail but
aims to place the later arguments in context. In
section 3, we discuss cognitive biases and
heuristics which influence perceptions of
uncertainty. The link between a perceived level of
uncertainty or confidence and a number of wider
situational and personal factors is illustrated.
Finally, in section 4, we focus on uncertainties in
decision models and decision frameworks,
including their normative assumptions and ability
to reduce judgemental biases. We argue that the
large number of alternative frameworks can create
confusion and encourage indecision, rather than
reducing it, if the methodological diversity is not
2

Position paper submitted to workshop
“Sensitivity and Uncertainty Assessment of
Integrated Environmental Models”, organised
during the Summit on Environmental Modelling
and Software (iMESs) 2006, July 9-12 Burlington,
USA.

tackled sensibly. We show that perceptions and
assessments of uncertainty are dependent on the
formulation of policy problems and the extent to
which a decision framework is embraced by policy
makers.
2.

SCIENTIFIC POLICY AID: BETWEEN
SCIENCE AND POLICY

The common distinction between “scientific” (also
“statistical”, but narrower in meaning) and
“political” (also “human reflection”) uncertainties
has allowed researchers from different disciplines
to encapsulate issues which seem tangible from
their own disciplinary perspectives. However, due
to the flexible boundary between what is perceived
as testable (and thus scientific and objective) and
what is perceived as untestable (and thus
subjective and suspicious), this distinction is often
inconsistent. Scientific uncertainty [Gupta et al.,
2003; Heazle, 2004; Jamieson, 1996] is typically
associated with the quantifiable uncertainties that
arise from inadequate methods and instruments or
conflicts between what is understood of the
environment (e.g. mechanisms) and what is
observed (e.g. events). Within this broad
understanding, numerous methodologies have
emerged for expressing, manipulating and using
uncertain quantities. Such expressions range in
detail from bounds [Norton, 1996], to set-based
approaches [Zadeh, 1973], and probability
distribution functions derived from observed
frequencies, expert judgements or both [Bernado
and Smith, 2001].
Political uncertainty [Brett and Keen, 2000; Hoel,
1998] is frequently conveyed as uncertainty
perceived or interpreted outside science. This
distinction is misplaced in general (politics exists
within science) and specifically in situations when
scientists aim to affect policy; first, because
implementation is a benchmark of policy-related
research and neglecting subjective viewpoints,
preferences, or perceptions may significantly
reduce the prospect of success; and, secondly,
because there are many ‘value-laden’ choices that
are indispensable in policy making, for which
science has no special voice. The latter implies
that any assumptions and associated judgements
must be transparent and subject to debate among
all involved parties. Although policy-related
decisions often depend on technical advice that is
difficult for non-specialists to understand,
scientists must be accountable for communicating
this advice, and its associated uncertainties, in a
way that is understandable to non-experts.
Many have argued that policy (or action) related
research differs from mainstream science in

several ways: it is action oriented (in the sense that
the implementation concerns are a part of the
research); integrated; value committed (as opposite
to ‘value-free’); situation specific; operating on
long term goals and sensitive to lack of
commitment among actors [Meppem, 2000; Shi,
2004]. In practice, however, this distinction
obscures the diversity of “policy related research”
(policy-relevant research, research on policy etc.)
and researchers (e.g. scientists, government
advisers, officials) working on environmental
policy, as well as the scales of policy considered.
In general, these differences are most apparent for
large, interdisciplinary, problems, such as
sustainable development (SD) and integrated water
resource management (IWRM), which engage
large numbers of researchers, often from widely
different backgrounds. These areas have attracted
considerable interest, including both unwarranted
enthusiasm and, partly misplaced, criticism in
recent years. Although these concepts are arguably
vague, elusive, impractical, and susceptible to
misinterpretations and hypocrisy [Biswas, 2004;
Robinson, 2004; van der Zaag, 2005], they have
encouraged wide-ranging discussion and reflection
about the values, differences, goals and procedures
required to achieve them, leading in turn to a high
commitment for their implementation. Of course,
such commitments may be partly explained by the
vague nature of these concepts, and the consequent
scope for re-interpretation and justification of
action or inaction by those in power.
Different epistemological frameworks such as post
normal science; ecological economics; adaptive
management; post-modern science; and mode2
science have been proposed to describe
characteristics and ‘guiding principles’ of policy
related research [Meppem, 2000; Norgaard, 2004;
Shi, 2004; Tacconi, 1998; van den Bergh and
others, 2000b]. However, these frameworks are no
more distinct than the problems they address, and
partly suffer from overemphasising what is
considered
“positive”
progress
while
marginalising (caricaturing) others aspects.
Nevertheless, they are compelling in other
respects, including their re-definition of relations
between science and society; release from
disciplinary
and
institutional
rigidity;
methodological pluralism (embracing ambiguity);
surfacing one’s own normative assumptions,
values, motives, potentials and limits; and a
engagement in ongoing dialog [Muller, 2003].
This has several important implications: first,
scientists are more likely to facilitate policy
processes than to determinate it; secondly, the
process of policy making is at least as important as
its outcomes; thirdly, the distinction between
scientific and ‘other’ uncertainties is a poor one

because they overlap strongly, as is the assertion
that scientific uncertainties are somehow ‘out
there’ in the environment.
3.

FACTORS INFLUENCING
PERCEPTIONS OF UNCERTAINTY

There is a vast body of literature in cognitive
sciences,
experimental
psychology
and
behavioural decision theory dedicated to the study
of inconsistencies underlying judgement and
choice. Probably the best known are framing
effects [Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974], which
refer to changing preferences in normatively
equivalent situations. According to Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) a decision frame refers to a
“decision maker’s conception of acts, outcomes,
and contingencies associated with a particular
choice”. In a strict sense, the definition is applied
to situations in which the presentation of a
problem is slightly manipulated (e.g. half full vs.
half empty) but the prospects remain unchanged3.
In a loose sense the framing effects go beyond a
simple semantic manipulation and include
substantially different formulations of the ‘same’
problem (such as positive – gain vs. negative –
loss frames), where ‘same’ is defined in the
context of economic theory [Kuhberger, 1998].
Describing identical problems in different frames
can elicit different preferences: by highlighting the
positive aspects of a problem, risk-aversion is
encouraged; whereas negative framing encourages
risk-seeking. Others suggested a typology of
framing effects with different underlying
mechanisms and consequences, distinguishing
between risky choice, goal and attribute framing
[Levin et al., 1998].
Tversky and Kahnemann [1974] and Kahnemann
and Tversky [1996] suggest that intuitive
judgement is mediated by a number of distinctive
mental operations, called judgemental heuristics4.
Although practical, these heuristics lead to errors
and inconsistencies in judgements. Their study is
practically motivated (to recognise limitations of
intuitive choices) and helps to understand

psychological processes underlying perception and
judgement. An Availability heuristic, for example,
refers to the positive weighting of an event that
can be easily remembered5 [Alexander; Greening
et al., 1996; Kahneman and Tversky, 1996].
People tend to base their probabilistic assessments
on the number of instances they can recall.
Judgements are not simply retrieved from memory
but are derived from a process that involves
recalling memorable information [Carroll, 1978].
Base-rate neglect reflects the tendency of people
to base intuitive predictions and judgements of
probability on similarity or representatives rather
than (explicitly stated) base rates of outcomes.
Conjunction fallacy (see e.g. [Fantino, 1998;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1982] refers to the
tendency of people to rate the probability of two
events more likely to occur than one of them
alone. Confirmation bias [Fiedler, 2000; Jonas et
al., 2001; Patino, 1997] refer to selective
information processing, favouring information
which confirms rather than contradicts the belief
and leads to all but one or two of the most
important
aspects
to
be
disregarded.
Overconfidence [Brenner and Koehler, 1996;
Tversky and Kahnemann, 1974] refers to the
underestimation of uncertainties in some areas
compared to the ‘average response’ whereas
underconfidence refers to the exaggeration of
some uncertainties. A good overview about these
and other biases and heuristics can be found in
[Berthoz, 2004; Eisenfuehr and Weber, 2003;
Kahneman et al., 1982]. Interestingly, despite a
rich literature on expert elicitation of probabilities
and risks (e.g. [Ayyub, 2001; Moorthy and Fieller,
1998], few studies have attempted to integrate the
social-psychological aspects of expert elicitation
with the statistical aspects of defining uncertainty,
although numerous researchers acknowledge this
problem (see [Moorthy and Fieller, 1998].
Opinions on risk and uncertainty are also
associated with an individual’s character and
personality [Chen and Lee, 2003; Hertwig et al.,
2005; Larichev, 1992; Lu et al., 2001a; Soane and
Chmiel, 2005]. Different cognitive styles6 have
been employed to explain these phenomena [Blais
and others, 2005; Lu and others, 2001a],

3

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) used disease
outbreak example in which the prospect of saving
200 (out of 600) people is successively described
as sustaining 400 casualties (out of 600).
4

Heuristic is a subconscious process of evaluation
of information (Patt and Dessai, 2005) or a
particular technique of directing your attention in
learning,
discovery,
or
problem-solving
(wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic;
accessed on march 13, 2006).

5

[Kahneman and Tversky, 1996] uses as an
examples judgement of the prevalence of suicide
being mediated by the easy with which suicide
instances come to mind.
6

Cognitive types are chronic motivations
determining the initialisation, course and cessation
of information seeking and processing [Blais et al.,
2005]

employing different measures of cognitive style,
such as the need for enjoyable and challenging
cognitive activities; the need to impose structure to
dispel doubt and uncertainty; fear of invalidity,
information gathering (perception styles) and
information evaluation (judgement styles).
Numerous researchers [Kowert and Hermann,
1997; Nicholson et al., 2005; Simon et al., 2000]
have found a positive association between risk
behaviour and a number of distinctive personal
characteristics.

embodied in cognitive structures, referred to as
mental models, which are powerful in facilitating
learning and qualitative reasoning but less efficient
at handling large amounts of data, representing
complex phenomena, or capturing non-linear
feedback processes. These models are incomplete
and imprecisely stated, implicit, intuitive, and
often wrong. The term ‘mental model’ is itself ill
defined, being used for a wide variety of mental
constructs, but intuitively understandable and thus
favoured in a number of scientific disciplines.

Differences in opinion (or ‘biases’) on risk and
uncertainty vary systematically between groups of
scientists and policy makers, as well as between
individuals. For example, scientists tend to
overestimate the uncertainties associated with
research from competing groups (e.g. Pinch,
1981). An inability to listen carefully or lack of
critical investigation (including its deliberate
suppression) may decrease group performance and
conviction. [Janis, 1972] identified several
symptoms or biases7 applicable to group
performance [Esser, 1998; Turner and Pratkanis,
1998a; Turner and Pratkanis, 1998b]. These
symptoms are especially apparent in highly
cohesive, isolated, groups with a dominant leader.
In such situations, groups tend to perform poorly
in terms of surveying alternatives and objectives
and appraising uncertainty and risk, leading to
poor decision making [McCauley, 1998;
Moorhead et al., 1998]. [Hodson and Sorrentino,
1997] suggested that uncertainty-oriented groups
are less susceptible to these problems, especially
under open-leadership and when a variety of
opinions are heard.

A comprehensive discussion of the individual and
social factors that govern the quality of intuitive
decision making and perceptions of uncertainty is
beyond of the scope of this paper. Nevertheless,
this short review illustrates how perceptions or
beliefs are translated into weight attached to
uncertainty or lack of confidence. Furthermore,
while it is difficult to assess uncertainty resulting
from these biases and heuristics, it is important to
acknowledge them in policy processes.

Cognitive modelling is used in a number of fields
such as system dynamics, DSS and computer
science [Barr and Sharda, 1997; Blais and others,
2005; Chen and Lee, 2003; Jiang et al., 2000;
Kahai et al., 1998; Lu and others, 2001a]. It
attempts to facilitate enrichment and validation of
human beliefs and perceptions (mental models)
and encourage backward and forward thinking
[Chen and Lee, 2003]. Intuitive decision making
involves deeply held beliefs and assumptions
through which reality is constructed [Chen and
Lee, 2003]. Knowledge in human brains is

4.

UNCERTAINTY
MODELS

IN

DECISION

Choosing one policy measure from a set of
mutually exclusive alternatives is limited by our
capacity to process all important factors when
tackling large environmental problems, such as
biodiversity conservation, water and soil
degradation, and climate change. In addition to
these cognitive limitations, people hold different
views about what is important and worthy of
pursuit. Competing goals and different underlying
values attached to outcomes of policies are yet
another source of disagreement and uncertainty in
decision making.
Decision analysis8 helps to avoid biases in
judgement and make decisions more compatible
with normative axioms of rationality for situations
involving multiple, conflicting interests and
beliefs. Decision models (DM) result from the
systematic exploration and negotiation of a
‘problem’, including its existence, boundaries and
structure. DM comprise alternative courses of
actions (policies or policy measures); decision
goals - translated into more tangible evaluation
criteria - against which the policies are weighed;

7

These syndromes were called together
“groupthink”. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary
explains the term as “a pattern of thought
characterized
by
self-deception,
forced
manufacture of consent, and conformity to group
values
and
ethics”
(see
http://www.mw.com/dictionary/groupthink, accessed on March
13, 2006).
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For the purpose of this paper we refer to decision
analysis as a set of procedures, methods, and tools
for identifying, clearly representing, and formally
assessing the important aspects of a decision
situation. This is different as e.g. in [Raiffa, 1997]
where it refers to application of maximum
expected utility axioms.

and preferences, which describe how well the
policies satisfy the objectives. There are normally
several candidate policies; for example, high
nitrate pollution can be tackled by introducing
financial
incentives,
changing
nutrient
management in farms, by protecting littoral
vegetation and favouring phytodepuration, or by
improving the effectiveness of waste water
treatment plants, WWTP). Binary (yes/no)
choices, such as whether to adhere to the Kyoto
protocol for reducing greenhouse gas emissions9
are frequently indicative of escalating conflicts due
to incommensurable ethical principles, values and
interests. Goals may refer to competing targets,
e.g. macro-economic developments vs. social
impact; favouring different policies so that no
single option outperforms all others. In these
situations, decision makers may be a priory
uncertain (undecided) about what policy action is
most appropriate. This indecisiveness is a result of
the diversity of decision outcomes, which are not
uniformly distributed in space and time (e.g.
different policy impacts on upstream vs.
downstream water users; WWTP extensions may
have an earlier impact on nitrate concentration
than land use changes) or the values attached to
them. Uncertainty in the outcomes of a choice
poses yet another challenge for decision making.
The trade-offs or preferences10 are value
judgements, which are frequently not observable11
and must be revealed or approximated. Such
uncovered preferences are context specific and
depend on the description and framing of a
problem, and how the questions are formulated.
For example, to assess the environmental costs of
irrigation, one must consider the value of wetlands
and riverine ecosystems deprived by water
abstraction. These values, regardless of whether
they are in monetary terms or relative utility, may
be difficult to approximate as the results depend
on the respondents’ prior knowledge or on what
they think others would approve. In situations
involving uncertainty, preferences are formed over

probabilities of possible outcomes of the policies
and integrated into the decision model. These
preferences embody attitudes towards risk (risk
aversion vs. risk seeking vs. risk neutrality),
defined according to the value individuals attach to
the uncertain outcomes of a decision. This mixing
of probability and utility is also found in the
formulation and estimation of statistical models in
the physical sciences (Moorthy and Fieler, 1998).
DM resemble scientific simulation models (SM) in
terms of their structure, and tendency to abstract
and simplify phenomena deemed important for a
particular case. For this reason, attempts have been
made to classify the types and sources of
uncertainty that arise in decision models [French
and Gabrielli, 2004; French, 1995] in a similar
way to SM12. Important sources of uncertainty in
DM include the extent to which decision criteria
approximate the goals and objectives of a study;
redundancy within criteria and subsequent
overestimation of some aspects; coherence and
consistency of preferences; predictability of policy
outcomes; representativeness of actors invited to
deliberate on policy choices; ambiguity of
policies/objectives and expectations about their
implementation. Uncertainties can also be
classified by the different stages of a decision
process, including boundary negotiation; model
development; use of models to challenge thinking
and interpretation of the results from modelling.
Yet there are important differences between DM
and SM which limit the practical value of such
typologies in DM, as discussed below.
Numerous decision frameworks13 are available to
(more or less explicitly) elicit the preferences of
individuals and to aggregate them across different
objectives (intra-personal aggregation) and across
different actors (inter-personal aggregation). The
extent to which specific DM are considered
consistent and ‘rational’ depends on the
compliance of the elicited preferences with the
12
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Kyoto protocol is an amendment to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Other examples of binary choices are
construction of mobile barriers in Venetian lagoon
or the Messina’s bridge connecting Sicily with the
mainland.
10

Preferences as dealt with in decision theory are
real or imagined choices, judgements of merits or
degree of (subjectively perceived) satisfaction,
about policy options or criteria.
11

In classical economics market prices are
consumer preferences.

For a detailed discussion of uncertainty
types/sources in simulation models see [Brown,
2004; Brown and others, 2005; Drechsler et al.,
1998; Finkel, 1990; Morgan and Henrion, 1990]
13

Decision frameworks are referred to as analytic
techniques aimed at synthesizing available
information from many /narrow or broader) aspect
of the problem to assess consequences of different
policy options. The concept is sufficiently large to
include any normative decision techniques
including cost-benefit analysis, cost effectiveness
analysis, cost utility analysis, multiple-criteria
analysis, game theory, utility theory, risk benefit
analysis, operation research, see also [Toth, 2000].

model’s assumptions and its ability to outplay
cognitive biases. The models differ considerably in
terms of (i) the underlying theory and assumptions
(e.g. monetary valuation; utility theory; value
function approaches; outranking techniques,
Bayesian statistics, participatory deliberation); (ii)
the approach pursued (e.g. generation of trade-offs
versus elicitation of value judgements; a priori
methods versus progressive or interactive
methods, etc.), (iii) the assumed form of
preference function (e.g. non-additive versus
additive, linear versus nonlinear), (iv) the way
value judgements are elicited (e.g. direct
assessment versus elicitation of trade-offs), and (v)
the extent to which the method accommodates
different perspectives and problem structures.
Although DM vary in purpose, any given decision
problem can typically be addressed with more than
one DM. As such, DMs act as “lenses” through
which the policy problem is viewed, and different
DMs may (frequently do) lead to different
conclusions. More detailed discussions about the
strengths and flaws associated with specific DM
can be found in [Bell et al., 2001; Berthoz, 2004;
Eisenfuehr and Weber, 2003; French, 1995; Gelso
and Peterson, 2005; Hanley, 2001; Kangas and
Kangas, 2004; Larichev, 1992; Lienhoop and
MacMillan; Liljas and Blumenschein, 2000;
Mingers and Rosenhead, 2004; Poyhonen and
Hamalainen, 2001; Ryan, 1999; van den Bergh et
al., 2000a].
The process of eliciting preferences can also
introduce uncertainty into DM. In this context the
description and framing of a problem, as well as
the formulation of specific questions, can
influence the preferences elicited, and hence the
reliability of the results.
Prior knowledge,
preconceived options, levels of understanding of
the issues, composition of the interviewed group,
levels of income and education and the time spent
considering a problem all influence the elicited
preferences. Thus, the ‘true’ beliefs of the
individuals may not be elicited, especially if
people find value judgements difficult and, in this
case, they may adjust their reply to conform with
what they believe the interviewer, or the group,
finds most acceptable (compliance biases). As a
result, the respondents may ultimately feel
manipulated by the method or interviewer, and
have limited confidence in the results obtained.
These problems are greatest when (i) the goods or
benefits are unique and cannot be substituted or
replaced, or when it is an important component of
the respondents endowment; and (ii) too many
alternatives/criteria are presented [Jia and Fischer,
1993] or differences in values are high [Bell et al.,

2003; Hobbs and Horn, 1997; Hobbs and Meier,
1994].
The variety of different decision frameworks is
problematic, as different methods may (normally
do) yield different results and hence the decision
may depend on the methods selected. Given the
large number of methods available, choosing the
most appropriate one is difficult and, typically,
only a small number of well-known methods are
applied. There is no simple criterion for preferring
one technique over the others in any given
situation; unsurprisingly, most scientific studies
show strong partiality for whichever technique
conforms best to the world view of the policy
adviser. The choice of method is frequently
influenced by the beliefs of those identifying
policy options, scientists being no exception. The
disputes regarding the use of alternative
approaches are sometimes based on prejudices,
misconceptions or oversimplifications of the
criticised methods, while intentionally concealing
the weaknesses of the preferred methods. In other
cases, alternative decision methods are ignored,
and hence the impacts of selecting a specific
method are not considered. Clearly, the subjective
choices of scientists and decision makers are an
important component of decision making, but the
impacts of methodological diversity, namely the
availability of multiple candidate methods
(sometimes referred to as ‘equifinality’ in the
physical sciences), has received relatively little
attention in decision making.
In summary, disagreements are inevitable when
multiple possible methods are available to address
any given decision problem. To overcome this,
different methods could be applied in parallel,
thereby identifying similarities and highlighting
inconsistencies between methods. This could be
seen as an educational exercise, whereby the
decision maker learns more about their own
preferences [Hobbs and Horn, 1997]. Indeed,
according to [French, 1995], critical self-reflection
is at least as important as the outcome reached
through DM. This approach has also been
suggested in the physical sciences, where multiple
possible explanations of physical data and
processes are common (e.g.[Refsgaard and others,
2005]. However, given the practical problems of
comparing methods (time, resources, expertise), as
well as the problems of selecting an appropriate
range of ‘candidate methods’, further evidence is
required on the practicality and value of this
approach.

5.

CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION

As a result of the previous discussion, it is
apparent that perceptions of uncertainty, scientific
or otherwise, depend strongly on the context in
which they were developed, and that any treatment
of uncertainty in policy related research must
acknowledge this. If uncertainty is viewed as a
level of confidence, and thus dependent on the
beliefs of individuals and groups of people, there
is a clear correspondence between a decision
maker’s perceived uncertainty and their level of
satisfaction, trust and acceptance of the resulting
decisions. However, establishing confidence
(reducing uncertainty) is less straightforward,
since the main sources of uncertainty are casespecific and vary with the decision problem, levels
and access to information, the expertise, interest,
and personalities of those involved and the
methods used to elicit preferences. In practice,
these sources of uncertainty are difficult to specify
precisely and cannot be quantified (i.e.
numerically) in an operational way. This stems
from the inherent difficulty of identifying subtle
changes in personal relations, perceptions, and
level of trust, all of which are central to decision
making. Thus, while it may be possible to develop
classifications of uncertainty, such as lists of
cognitive biases and heuristics, it is likely that
such attempts will improve the qualification of
uncertainties in specific cases. This points to an
important difference between DM, whose
principal aim is to establish values and preferences
(which are strongly dependent on the act of
observing) and scientific simulation models, where
values and preferences are secondary, and results
are (presumed) only weakly dependent on the act
of observing. These differences are important in
understanding the difficulties of communication
between scientists and decision makers on issues
of uncertainty.
Despite these differences, scientific models and
decision models are complementary. The former
improve our ability to store and process large
volumes of data and analyse complex patterns and
non-linear feedbacks, which are beyond our visual
and mental capacity. The latter enhance our ability
to make coherent choices and comply with
assumed axioms of rational behaviour. In both
cases, there are strong links between model
structures and normative frameworks (defining
what is rational and desirable), although they are
more apparent in DM. As such, it is difficult to
compare models without considering the
appropriateness of their normative assumptions.
This paper does not include a deeper reflection
about the role of epistemological frameworks in

informing environmental policy making or in
prompting
divergent
understandings
of
uncertainty. Indeed, this is partly because the
authors hold different opinions on the extent to
which they hamper progress. However, it is clear
that particular conceptions of uncertainty are
influenced by the wider context in which research
is conducted, including its social, political and
ethical frameworks.
6.
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